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Compliance with laws and regulations depends on the expected penalty facing violators. The 
expected  penalty  depends  on  both  the  probability  of  punishment  and  the  severity  of  the 
punishment  if  caught.  A  key  question  in  the  economics  of  crime  literature  is  whether 
increasing the probability  of punishment is  a more effective  deterrent than an  equivalent 
increase in the severity of punishment. The answer to this question has implications for the 
design of enforcement strategies and, in particular, for the allocation of limited resources. 
Should additional resources be devoted to catching violators or to punishing them? This issue 
is important not just for policing criminal law, but also for the enforcement of a wide range of 
laws  and  regulations  including  environmental,  occupational  health  and  safety,  and  traffic 
regulations, as well as tax, fraud, and antitrust laws. 
  
The seminal work in the economics of crime and enforcement literature is Becker (1968). In 
his  model,  rational  decision  makers  compare  the  expected  gain  from  offending  with  the 
expected penalty from offending. Becker (1968) identifies the key role of risk preferences. In 
particular, risk neutral individuals consider only the expected penalty and not its composition, 
and  are  therefore  indifferent  to  offsetting  changes  in  the  probability  and  severity  of 
punishment that keep the expected penalty constant. Risk averse individuals, on the other 
hand, are deterred more by (equivalent) increases in severity of punishment, while risk lovers 
are deterred more by (equivalent) increases in the probability of detection. Despite the fact 
that many extensions have been made to Becker’s (1968) theoretical model (Polinksy and 
Shavell, 2000, summarise these developments), the relatively efficacy of violation detection 
versus severity remains an unresolved question. 
 
Empirical evidence has largely come from general crime data. The consensus of results from 
this literature (summarised by Eide, 2000) supports the general theory of deterrence. That is, 
increases  in  variables  such  as  the  probability  of  detection  and  conviction,  along  with 
increases in the penalty (either fines or jail terms) tend to reduce crime rates. Comparing the 
magnitude of the impacts, increases in the probability of punishment have a larger and more 
significant impact than increases in the severity of punishment. The results of these studies 
however are often controversial because of the nature of the data used. Data can be either 
individual level or at an aggregate (e.g. state) level. Individual level data is either sourced 3 
 
from  the  criminal  justice  system,  creating  sample  selection  issues  (e.g.  the  data  set  in 
Grogger, 1991, includes only those with a history of past offenses), or based on self-reported 
data.  If  aggregate  level  data  is  used,  the  potential  endogeneity  of  the  crime  rate  and 
enforcement  parameters,  such  as  the  probability  of  detection,  must  be  accounted  for. 
Regardless of the type of data, all of these empirical studies have to construct measures of the 
probability and severity of punishment that are proxies based on past data, as well as being 
estimated without knowledge of the true level of offending.  These constructed measures will 
also differ from individual perceptions of both the likelihood of being caught and the likely 
punishment if arrested. 
 
Because of these data controversies, less credence is given to comparisons of the relative 
magnitudes of the effects of increasing probability and severity than to the fact that both have 
a negative impact on crime. This leads Polinsky and Shavell (2000, p.73, emphasis added) to 
conclude their survey of the economic theory of public enforcement of law with the following 
statement: “[e]mpirical work on law enforcement is strongly needed to better measure the 
deterrent  effects  of  sanctions,  especially  to  separate  the  influence  of  the  magnitude  of 
sanctions from their probability of application.” 
 
Empirical studies on regulatory enforcement are fewer.  These studies must also rely on 
constructed measures of the key variables, and in the case of environmental enforcement, 
penalty information was not available until recent studies.  For example, Gray and Deily 
(1996)  find  that  enforcement  actions  increase  compliance  among  steel  making  plants, 
however their analysis includes no data on fines and the enforcement measure is number of 
actions taken during the previous two years.   Stafford (2002) estimates the impact of an 
increase in fines for hazardous waste violations using an indicator variable for pre- and post-
change years.  Recent work by Shimshack and Ward (2005) on water pollution includes data 
on past penalties and inspections.  Using plant level self-reported data, they find that (past) 
fines are a more successful deterrent than inspections.
1   
 
This paper takes a different approach and uses laboratory experiments to investigate whether 
(equivalent) changes in the probability or severity of punishment have a larger impact on 
compliance behaviour. The use of a controlled laboratory setting can overcome some of the 
                                                 
1 The inspection measure is the number of inspections at the plant within the last year, while the fine measure is 
a dummy variable indicating if any firm was fined in the preceding 12 months. 4 
 
data issues that hamper empirical studies. In particular, individual compliance decisions are 
directly observed, and the probability and severity of punishment is varied in a controlled 
manner that keeps the expected penalty constant.  In addition, the direction of causality is 
clear, and individual perceptions of the likelihood of detection and size of potential penalties 
are unlikely to deviate substantially from the experimental parameters. 
 
Despite  the  recent  growth  of  experimental  economics  as  a  field,  there  are  only  a  few 
enforcement experiments and even fewer that consider the relative efficacy of probabilities 
versus severity of punishment.  Experiments on regulatory enforcement more generally are 
Clark,  Friesen  and  Muller  (2004)  and  Cason  and  Gangadharan  (2006a);  Murphy  and 
Stranlund (2008) who focus on self-auditing and self-reporting; and Murphy and Stranlund 
(2007)  and  Cason  and  Gangadharan  (2006b)  on  the  enforcement  of  emissions  trading 
schemes. Although not the focus of their paper, Murphy and Stranlund (2007) include two 
treatments with the same expected penalty, but vary the probability of detection from “low” 
to “high”.  They find that compliance is unaffected by this change.  
 
To my knowledge, there are only two published economics experiments that focus on the 
effects of probability versus severity of punishment.
2  Block and Gerety (1995) conduct an 
antitrust experiment with a unique subject pool  – prisoners – along with a second standard 
subject pool of students. They find that students are more responsive to increases in the fine 
compared with equivalent increases in the probability of detection, a result consistent with 
risk aversion. On the other hand, prisoners respond more to increases in the probability of 
detection, a result consistent with being risk lovers.  Anderson and Stafford (2003) use a 
public goods  experiment  where free-riding is  punished, and find  intriguing evidence that 
subject contributions respond more to punishment severity than to punishment probability. 
 
While limited in number, these two sets of experimental results involving student subjects 
contrast  with  the  findings  of  the  empirical  crime  literature.  One  explanation  for  this 
difference is that prisoners, and more generally criminals, are risk lovers, while the typical 
student is risk averse.  Block and Gerety (1995) provide some evidence in support of this 
                                                 
2 Criminologists Nagin and Pogarsky (2003) also use an experimental approach, but their parameter changes 
appear unlikely to reflect equivalent changes in probabilities (described as either “low” or “high”) and penalties 




difference,  but  their  measure  of  risk  attitudes  (using  hypothetical  choices)  found  no 
difference between the two subject pools.  This paper contributes to this debate using student 
subjects and by explicitly measuring both risk preferences and compliance decisions.  When 
drawing policy implications for regulatory enforcement and other non-violent crimes such as 
fraud and traffic violations, student subjects may be the more relevant population to consider. 
 
This paper investigates this contrasting evidence by running experiments that are distinct 
from the previous work in the following ways.  First, compliance decisions are made in a 
simple individual-decision making environment, in contrast to the group decision making 
associated with collusion (Block and Gerety, 1995) and public goods contributions (Anderson 
and Stafford, 2003).  Second, an explicit link is made to theory by measuring subjects’ risk 
preference prior to undertaking the compliance decisions.  Third, enforcement parameters are 
varied in a systematic manner over a range of values motivated by theoretical predictions.  
The parameters are varied to ensure that only equivalent changes in probability and severity 
of punishment are compared.  The main finding is that increases in the severity of punishment 
are a more effective deterrent than equivalent increases in the probability of punishment, 
which is consistent with risk aversion but distinct from the empirical crime literature. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows.  The theoretical framework and predictions are outlined in 
Section 2.  Section 3 describes the experimental design, with the results presented in Section 
4.  The conclusion follows in Section 5. 
 
2. Theoretical Model and Predictions 
 
Expected  utility  theory  predicts  that  risk  averse  individuals  are  deterred  more  by  rising 
punishments than probabilities, while the opposite is true for risk loving individuals.  The 
theoretical model is based on Becker (1968).
3  An individual (or firm) faces a regulation (e.g. 
environmental, health and safety) or law (e.g. speed restriction) that costs $c to comply with.
4  
Then, with an income (or profit) per period of  $y, the individual receives a certain payoff of 
y–c if they comply, yielding utility of 
   
                                                 
3 The many theoretical contributions since Becker (1968) are summarized in Eide (2000) and Polinsky and 
Shavell (2000). 
4 In Becker’s model, the cost of compliance is the foregone gain from offending. 6 
 
  ?𝑈 𝑐????𝑦  = 𝑈 𝑦 − 𝑐 .  (1)  
 
Alternatively, if they choose not to comply (violate), with probability p they are caught and 
subsequently fined $F.  The expected utility in the case of violation is: 
 
  ?𝑈 𝑣𝑖??𝑎𝑡𝑒  = ?𝑈 𝑦 − ?  +  1 − ? 𝑈(𝑦).  (2)  
 
In this simple discrete situation, an individual chooses to violate when (1) > (2), and complies 
otherwise.  An increase in either p or F reduces (2) and thereby makes it less likely that any 
given individual will comply.  The key question to be addressed in this paper is whether 
increasing p has a larger impact on expected utility, and hence compliance behaviour, than an 
equivalent increase in F.  As demonstrated by Becker (1968) the answer depends on the risk 
preference of the individual.  To see this, derive the elasticity of the change in ?𝑈 𝑣𝑖??𝑎𝑡𝑒   
with respect to p  𝜂?  and F  𝜂? , where both are defined as positive values. 
 
  𝜂? = −
?
?𝑈





?𝑈′ 𝑦 − ?   (4)  
 




𝑈 𝑦  − 𝑈 𝑦 − ? 
?
  > 𝑈′ 𝑦 − ?   
 
(5)  
This inequality holds when the average rate of change in utility exceeds the marginal rate of 
change,  which  is  true  when 𝑈′′ 𝑦  > 0,  i.e.  when  an  individual  is  risk  loving.  Thus, 
increasing  the  probability  of  detection  (p)  has  a  larger  impact  on  deterrence  than  an 
equivalent increase in the fine (f) for risk loving individuals, while the opposite is true for the 
risk averse.  Risk neutral individuals are indifferent. 
 
This result can also be demonstrated graphically, as is shown in Figure 1 for the case of a risk 
averse  individual.    An  increase  in  the  probability  of  detection  from ?0 to ?1 reduces  the 
expected utility from violating to ?𝑈(?1?0), but an increase in the fine from ?0 to ?1 causes 7 
 
an even larger reduction in the expected utility from violating to ?𝑈(?0?1), noting that in 
both cases the expected fine is the same (?1?0 = ?0?1). 
 
To translate this into predictions regarding the average compliance rate, note that the discrete 
nature of the decision results in cases where individuals are (theoretically) unresponsive to 
changes in the enforcement parameters.  Specifically, if the compliance cost is less than the 
expected penalty  (c < pF) then both risk averse and risk neutral individuals will always 
comply, and when the compliance cost exceeds the expected penalty (c > pF) then both risk 
neutral and risk lovers will always violate.
5  This leads to the following predictions. 
 
Prediction  1:  If  c  >  pF,  then  an  increase  in  the  probability  of  detection  (p)  with  a 
corresponding decrease in the fine (F) such that the expected fine (pF) is unchanged, will 
result in a decrease in the average level of compliance. 
 
In this case, we expect no change in the decisions of those who are risk neutral or risk lovers, 
while some risk averse individuals will switch from compliance to violation. 
 
Prediction  2:  If  c  <  pF,  then  an  increase  in  the  probability  of  detection  (p)  with  a 
corresponding decrease in the fine (F) such that the expected fine (pF) is unchanged, will 
result in an increase in the average level of compliance. 
 
In this case we expect no change in the decisions of the risk neutral and risk averse, while 
some risk lovers will switch from violation to compliance. 
 
For clarity, these predictions are expressed as definite increases or decreases in the average 
level of compliance however a finding of “no change” would also be consistent with theory, 
while  a  change  in  the  opposite  direction  would  be  inconsistent.    The  average  level  of 
compliance  would  be  unchanged  if  there  were  few  individuals  with  the  required  risk 
preference or the change in enforcement parameters was too small to induce a change in 
behaviour. 
 
                                                 
5 There is obviously a third case where c = pF and risk averters comply, while risk lovers violate, and the risk 
neutral are indifferent.  This case is avoided in the experiment because this indifference could generate noise in 
the data. 8 
 
3. Experimental Design 
 
The experiment has two parts.  In the first part, subjects made a series of ten lottery choices, 
which were to estimate their risk preferences.  The second part of the experiment involved 
subjects making compliance choices in 30 periods, where the enforcement parameters were 
varied  across  the  periods  to  test  the  predictions  outlined  above.  To  avoid  confounding 
income effects, at the end of the experiment, one decision from part one and one period from 
part  two  were  randomly  selected  to  determine  subjects’  earnings.
6   In  addition  to  their 
earnings from the two parts, subjects also received a $5 participation fee. 
 
The  experiments  were  computerized  using  the  programme  Z-Tree  (Fischbacher,  2007), 
however  to  enhance  credibility,  physical  random  devices  were  used  to  select  the  lottery 
decision and compliance round that determined earnings.  Specifically, a ten-sided die was 
used to select one of the ten lottery choices and a bingo cage (containing numbered balls from 
one to thirty) was used to choose one compliance period.  In each part of the experiment, 
subjects  received  detailed  instructions  and  participated  in  training  exercises  prior  to 
undertaking the real decisions.
7 
 
3.1 Lottery Choices 
 
The lottery choice experiment developed by Holt and Laury (2002) was used to estimate 
subject’s risk preferences.  Subjects made the series of ten lottery choices shown in Table 1, 
with these being scaled versions of the choices used by Holt and Laury (2002) with a scaling 
factor of five chosen to ensure the range of payoffs is comparable with the payoffs in the 
second part of the experiment.
8  Subjects choose between a safe option (A) and a risky option 
(B), and as they move down the table the probability of the highest payoff increases, until 
finally the last decision involves no uncertain ty.  Subjects choices, and in particular the 
lottery at which they switch from choosing A to B, reveals their risk preference.
9   Risk 
                                                 
6 The practice of randomly selecting one round or choice for payment is common in lottery choice experiments 
where it is crucial to control for income and wealth effects from round to round (see e.g. Hey and Orme, 1994).  
Recent experiments support the validity of this procedure (e.g. Cubitt, Starmer and Sugden, 1998; Laury, 2005).   
7 A copy of the experimental instructions is available from the author. 
8 Payoffs in the scaled up version of the lottery choices ranged from $0.50  - $19.25, while payoffs in the 
compliance rounds ranged from $1.00 to $21.00. 
9 Consistent subjects should only switch once from A to B, and never back from B to A. 9 
 
neutral individuals should make four safe choices, the risk loving less than four safe choices, 
and the risk averse more than four safe choices. 
 
At the end of both parts of the experiment, one of these ten lottery choices was selected at 
random  using  a  ten-sided  die  and  played  for  real  according  to  the  subject’s  choice  and 
another roll of a ten-sided die.  Subjects were paid accordingly. 
 
3.2 Compliance Choices 
 
In the second part of the experiment, subjects made compliance decisions in 30 periods.  In 
each round, subjects received a trading (or gross) profit and then faced a choice of whether or 
not to comply with a regulation. Compliance incurred a certain cost, while violation incurred 
no  immediate  cost  but  the  possibility  of  being  inspected  and  subsequently  fined.    The 
compliance cost, probability of inspection, and fine were varied across periods in order to test 
the two predictions developed in Section 2. 
 
Specifically, Prediction 1 was tested in 16 periods where c>pF (Set 1), while Prediction 2 
was tested in 10 periods where c<pF (Set 2).  Within each set, a number of different expected 
fine and compliance cost combinations were developed to ensure that the results were not 
peculiar to the values chosen.  Each combination was used in at least two different periods.  
Because previous experimental findings show that most subjects are risk averse (Harrison and 
Rutstrom, 2008), more parameters were chosen for Set 1 than for Set 2.  The remaining four 
periods (Set 3) involved no uncertainty as the inspection probability was either zero or one 
and hence all subjects should make the same decision regardless of their risk preference.  
These four periods provide a basic check of subject’s decisions.  The set of parameter values 
was randomly ordered across the 30 periods, with the same order used in all experimental 
sessions to enhance comparability. 
 
The  choices  were  framed  as  general  compliance  decisions,  using  the  terminology  of  the 
previous paragraphs.  One drawback of more “loaded” as opposed to “neutral” language is 
that subjects may comply because of perceived social norms or experimenter demand effects 
or  both.  The  use  of  loaded  language  however  is  common  in  income-tax  compliance 
experiments, and several studies have shown no substantive difference in the results between 
neutral and loaded language (Alm, McClelland, and Schulze, 1992; Cason and Gangadharan 10 
 
2006a).  In addition, subsequent data analysis (see Section 4.1) checks for these effects and 




The experiments were held at the University of Queensland during March 2009.  There were 
139 participants over eight sessions, who earned AUS$30 on average.  Payments ranged from 
AUS$19.50 - $40.25 and each session lasted between 60-90 minutes.  Half of the subjects 
were female, the majority were first or second-year students (45% and 35% respectively), and 
about one-quarter had never taken an economics or statistics course.  Summary statistics are 
listed in Table 2 for both demographic variables and constructed outcome measures. 
 
4.1 Risk Aversion and Consistency of Choices  
 
The number of safe lottery choices made by the subjects in part one of the experiment is 
summarised in Table 3, which shows that the majority of subjects (83%) are risk averse, 
some are risk neutral (13%), and only a few are risk loving (4%).
10  These choices can also be 
analysed by considering the proportion of safe choices for each decision (rather than for each 
individual).  This is plotted in Figure  2, which shows that the proportion of safe choices 
generally exceeds the risk neutral prediction, suggesting that the majority of subjects are risk 
averse.  Only nine subjects (6.5%) switched back from Option B to Option A, and only one of 
these switched back more than once.
11  A further check is that everyone should choose th e 
safe option in decision 10, which involves no uncertainty.  Only one person got this wrong 
and it was one of the switchers. 
 
To investigate the potential for experimenter demand effects, the number of periods in which 
each subject chose to comply was counted, with Figure 3 showing the frequency of these 
compliance choices.  None of the 139 subjects chose to either always comply or violate in all 
periods.  The minimum number of periods complie d was 3, the maximum was 27, with the 
                                                 
10 These results are broadly consistent with the existing literature, for example, Holt and Laury (2002, Table 3) 
find 8% risk loving (both categories), 26% risk neutral, and 13% very risk averse in their baseline treatments.  
Payments here have been scaled up by a factor of five, so greater risk aversion is expected. 
11 This rate of switching is comparable to  Holt and Laury (2002, p.1648) who find that around 6% of subjects 
switched back. 11 
 
majority (86%) choosing to comply in between 11 - 21 periods.
12  The fact that no subject 
complied in all periods, and in fact very few (6%) complied in more than 21 periods, suggests 
that subjects were not complying because they thought they ought to . That is, there is little 
evidence that the use of “loaded” terminology generated “experimenter demand” effects. 
 
Decisions of subjects in the four periods without uncertainty (Set 3) give further insights.  
The parameter values in these periods and the resulting compliance rates are shown in Table 
4.  When p=0 everyone should violate and most did.  Specifically, in period 16, 10 out of the 
139 subjects complied (7%), while in period 21, only four subjects did (3%).  Only two 
subjects complied in both periods.  Subjects however tended to make more errors when p=1 
particularly earlier in the experiment.  In Period 12, 33 subjects (24%) erroneously chose to 
comply, but by period 27 when p=1 only 5 subjects made an erroneous choice.  This suggests 
that lack of experience may account for many of the errors in Period 12.  Indeed, of the 33 
subjects who choose comply in Period 12, only six made another error in the experiment. 
 
To further investigate the role of learning as opposed to general error proneness, the number 
of errors by subjects is tabulated in Table 5.  Subject mistakes are defined as either switching 
back in the lottery choice experiment or making the incorrect choice in one of the periods 
without uncertainty (Set 3).  Of the 139 subjects, 90 (65%) never made a mistake. Of the 
remaining 49 subjects, only 10 made more than one mistake as indicated by the shaded cells 
in the table. 
 
Before looking at the main research question, consider first whether the results are consistent 
with  the  basic  deterrence  hypothesis,  that  is,  does  increasing  either  the  probability  of 
inspection or the fine increase compliance, ceteris paribus?  Unlike the main analysis where 
the expected penalty (pF) is held constant, here pF increases.  The results in the Table 6 are 
for the 13 periods where the compliance cost (c) was $5 (including Set 3).  As you move 
down  a  column  or  along  a  row,  the  expected  fine  increases,  and  then  if  the  deterrence 
hypothesis holds, the compliance rate should increase.  All the changes are in the expected 
direction.  Using the sign test for matched pairs indicates that all these increases are highly 
significant (one-sided p-values = 0.00, except for p=0 when the p-value=0.05).
13 
                                                 
12 The subject who complied in only three periods, including one with p=0, was the only subject who switched 
twice during the lottery choice part of the experiment. 
13 Details of the statistical tests are available from the author. 12 
 
 
4.2 Univariate Tests 
 
Moving now to the main research question in this paper, the compliance rate in each period is 
reported in Table 7 where the data are organised so that along each row in the table both the 
expected fine and compliance cost are constant.  The top panel reports results from Set 1 
where c > pF and according to Prediction 1, as we move right along each row the compliance 
rate should fall.  The bottom panel reports results from Set 2 where c < pF and if Prediction 2 
is  correct,  as  we  move  right  along  each  row  the  compliance  rate  should  increase.    The 
numbers in <brackets> are the p-values from the sign test for matched pairs for adjacent cells 
along the row.  For Set 1 these are one-sided tests, but for Set 2 two-sided tests are used 
because no directional pattern was obvious from the data. 
 
Of the ten pair wise comparisons in the top panel (Set 1) six show compliance significantly 
falling as p increases holding pF constant (p-value=0.00, one-sided), two show no significant 
change, and two show compliance actually increasing (p-values=0.00 and 0.12, one-sided).  
Of the six pair wise comparisons in the bottom panel (Set 2), four show no change, while one 
shows a significant increase in compliance (bottom row) and another a significant decrease 
(second row).  Since the results of the lottery choice experiment indicate that few subjects are 
risk lovers it is not surprising to find no effect being common in Set 2.  Similarly, a result of 
no change in Set 1 is not evidence against Prediction 1 as it may simply be that the changes 
are not sufficient to cause a change in behaviour. 
 
To check how many of these anomalous results were due to error-prone individuals, the tests 
in Table 7 were recalculated using only the compliance decisions for the 90 individuals who 
never  made  an  error.    This  reduces  but  does  not  eliminate  the  anomalous  results.  In 
particular, in Set 1 there are still six pair wise comparisons that are significant decreases, but 
now three results of no change, and only one remaining wrong direction (p-value=0.08, one-
sided) in row 5. For Set 2, there are five results of no change, but still one wrong direction in 
row  2  (p-value=0.01,  two-sided).
14   This suggests that error -prone individuals may have 
resulted in some, but not all of these anomalous results. 
 
                                                 
14 Detailed results are available from the author. 13 
 
4.3 Panel Data Regression Analysis 
 
While the results from the univariate tests generally support Prediction 1 they do not control 
for  demographic  factors  and  possible  learning  over  the  periods.    The  following  section 
rectifies this by estimating a random effects probit model of compliance choices.  The dataset 
is a panel with 30 compliance decisions for each of the 139 subjects, and a binary dependent 
variable indicating whether the subject chose to comply in a particular period. 
 
The  model  can  be  motivated  as  a  latent  variable  model  where  the  latent  index  y*  is 
?𝑈 𝑐????𝑦  − ?𝑈(𝑣𝑖??𝑎𝑡𝑒) ,  which  is  modelled  as 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝑋𝑖𝑡? + ?𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ,  where  ?𝑖  is 
unobserved individual heterogeneity and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is  the usual idiosyncratic error term.   In this 
model  compliance  occurs  (𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1) if 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ >0,  otherwise  violation  occurs  (𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 0).  The 
explanatory  variables  fall  into  three  categories:  enforcement  variables,  demographic 
variables, and experimental control variables.   
 
The empirical strategy used to test the predictions excludes Fine as a separate explanatory 
variable  because  it  does  not  change  independently  of  the  Inspection  Probability  and  the 
Expected Fine.  A negative estimated coefficient on the variable Inspection Probability is 
then evidence in favour of Prediction 1.  That is, as the inspection probability increases, 




Along with standard demographic variables (e.g. gender, age),  the number of safe lottery 
choices from the first part of the experiment is also included  to measure risk preferences.  
The experimental control variables include  session dummies, and  a time trend (Period), to 
account for any learning or timing effect that occurred even though the order of parameters 
was predetermined in a random manner. 
 
The model is estimated separately for the two sets of parameters, with the results for Set 1 
(c>pF) reported in panel A of Table 8 and for Set 2 (c<pF) in panel B of Table 8.
16  In the 
                                                 
15 Block and Gerety (1995) use a similar approach but do not have panel data. 
16 Estimating the model using the entire dataset of 30 periods yields qualitatively similar results to Set 1.  That 
is, the coefficient on inspection probability is significantly negative, however the marginal effect is less tha n 
half of that reported in Table 9. 14 
 
first column any relevant periods from Set 3 are also included (All Periods) while the second 
and third columns only use periods where 0 < ? < 1 (Interior), and in the right column only 
the 90 subjects without errors are included (No Error). 
 
Consider  first  the  most  general  model  (All  Periods)  for  Set  1,  which  includes  all  the 
demographic  variables  as  well  as  dummy  variables  for  each  session.    All  the  treatment 
variables have the correct sign and are highly significant.  The coefficient on Inspection 
Probability is significantly negative providing support for Prediction 1.  Of the demographic 
variables,  only  gender  and  number  of  safe  choices  significantly  affect  the  probability  of 
compliance.  Females subjects are more likely to comply than similar male subjects, and 
those who made a greater number of safe lottery choices are also more likely to comply.  
Subjects are also more likely to comply in later periods.
17  Restricting the data to only those 
periods with 0 < ? < 1 (Interior I) does not qualitatively change any of the results.  When 
the observations are limited to only the 90 subjects who made no errors (No Error), the effect 
of Period becomes more statistically significant and fourth year students are more likely to 
comply,  ceteris  paribus.    In  all  three  models,  the  coefficient  on  Inspection  Probability 
remains negative providing robust evidence in support of Prediction 1.   
 
To  facilitate  computation  of  the  marginal  effects,  the  model  is  estimated  (Interior  II) 
excluding  the  insignificant  demographic  variables,  all  but  one  of  which  is  an  indicator 
variable,  and  the  session  variables.  Table  9  reports  the  marginal  effects  at  the  average 
treatment values, with the random effect equal to zero.  The gender effect is large, with 
females having a 13.3% higher probability of compliance than males  with the same risk 
preference.  In terms of magnitudes, a 1% increase in the probability of inspection decreases 
the  probability  of  compliance  by  slightly  less  than  1%.
18   The impact of changes in the 
expected  fine  and  compliance  cost  are  larger.    The  Period  effect,  while  statistically 
significant, is small in magnitude with each additional period increasing the probability of 
compliance  by  only  0.3%.    Gender  does  not  substantially  change  the  marginal  effects 
although females appear slightly more responsive to the parameter changes than males. 
 
                                                 
17 Very few of the session dummies are significant and none consistently so across all the models. 
18 The marginal effect of  Inspection Probability at average treatment values is slightly higher in the No Error 
model at 1.2% for females and 1.0% for males. 15 
 
With this non-linear estimation method, the magnitude of these marginal effects depends on 
the parameters at which they are evaluated.  Some indicative values are shown in Figure 4, 
where in the top case both the gender effect and marginal effect of inspections are constant 
throughout the range of values illustrated.  In the bottom case however, both the marginal 
effect  of  inspections  and  the  gender  effect  become  smaller  as  the  inspection  probability 
increases and the compliance probability falls to a low level. 
 
In addition to providing robust evidence in support of Prediction 1, two auxiliary conclusions 
are also worth mentioning.  The first regards the predictive value of the Holt and Laury 
(2002) lottery choice measure of risk preference.  In all versions of the model, the number of 
safe lottery choices made in part one of the experiment had a highly significant positive 
relationship with the probability of compliance in part two of the experiment.  A positive 
coefficient is expected because compliance is a riskless choice, while you face uncertainty if 
you choose violation. 
 
The second result is the substantial gender effect where (at average treatment values) females 
are 13% more likely to comply than males.  This effect is robust across all versions of the 
model.  This difference applies to “otherwise identical” female and male participants, so even 
though  female  participants  were  significantly  more  risk  averse  (average  number  of  safe 
lottery choices = 6.4) than male participants (average = 5.8, Mann-Whitney two-sided p-
value=0.0054), this cannot explain the gender effect.
19  Instead, the explanation may lie in 
different preferences or social conditioning, as other studies have found a similar effect.  For 
example, Nagin and Pogarsky (2003, p. 179) found that men were 10% more likely to cheat, 
which they note is “[c]onsistent with virtually all work relating gender to offending.”  Within 
economics, gender differences in social preferences and competitive inclinations have been 




Table 8B presents the results for Set 2, with the models defined in the same way as for Set 1.  
The results are sensitive to the dataset used, with consistent effects across the models found 
only for Expected Fine (positive), Compliance Cost (negative), and Number of Safe Lottery 
                                                 
19 This is consistent with a robust finding in the literature than women are more risk averse than men (Croson 
and Gneezy 2009). 
20 One exception is  Anderson and Stafford (2003) who f ound that gender was an insignificant determinant of 
group contributions in their public goods experiment. 16 
 
Choices (positive).  A positive coefficient on Inspection Probability is evidence in support of 
Prediction 2, but only occurs in the All Periods model.  The All Periods model includes not 
only the 10 periods of Set 2, but also Period 27 from Set 3 where p=1, c=5, F=6 and all 
except five subjects complied.  When data from Period 27 are excluded, as in Interior I, the 
coefficient  becomes  insignificant,  suggesting  that  the  positive  coefficient  is  strongly 
influenced by the results from this one period.  Interestingly when only error-free subjects are 
included (No Error), the coefficient becomes significantly negative.  The direction of the 
change is consistent with risk averse behaviour, although theoretically, risk averse individuals 
should always comply when c<pF.  I conjecture, but do not formally test, that this is due to 
decision-making errors, so that while the risk averse do not match the point predictions of 
expected utility theory exactly, they are consistent with the comparative static predictions.  It 
is also interesting to note that when Period 27 is excluded from the data, the Period effect 
disappears.  As for the demographic variables, there is no gender effect in Set 2, but having 
taken a statistics course increases your chance of compliance in most models.  The Number of 
Safe Lottery Choices continues to have a significant positive relationship with compliance.  
The evidence with regard to Prediction 2 is therefore mixed and dependent on the model 
estimated.  This conclusion is not surprising given that only five (3.6%) of the subjects were 




The main result of this paper is that increasing the severity of punishment is a more effective 
deterrent than an equivalent increase in the probability of punishment.  The lottery choice 
task  indicates  that  most  subjects  are  risk  averse,  and  the  aggregate  responses  in  the 
compliance task are theoretically consistent with this.  Indeed the number of safe lottery 
choices was a strong predictor of compliance behaviour.  While these results strongly contrast 
with those in the empirical crime literature, where increases in the probability of punishment 
have a larger and more significant impact on deterring crime than increases in the penalty, 
they  are  consistent  with  the  limited  amount  of  existing  experimental  evidence  involving 
student subjects. 
 
Two  broad  factors  can  account  for  the  different  results  between  the  empirical  and 
experimental literature.  The first difference is the methodology, with each approach having 17 
 
(different) limitations.  As discussed in Section 1, the empirical crime literature faces issues 
of  sample  selection,  the  possible  endogeneity  of  crime  and  enforcement,  and  the  use  of 
constructed measures of probabilities and penalties that are likely to differ from individual 
perceptions of these parameters.  The use of laboratory experiments overcomes these data 
issues,  but  in  doing so abstracts  from  real  world context such as  social  norms and non-
monetary punishments such as shame and prison sentences, which also affect deterrence.  
Both methods therefore have limitations, and it is not clear a priori which is necessarily more 
informative. 
 
The  second  point  of  difference  is  the  subject  pool,  with  the  empirical  crime  literature 
typically using data from criminals, while laboratory experiments typically involve students.  
While  the  results  of  Block  and  Gerety  (1995)  suggest  the  two  subject  pools  behave  in 
different ways, this has yet to be replicated in other studies.  On the other hand, students will 
be a more appropriate subject pool for many types of non-violent crime (e.g. traffic offences, 
fraud, false advertising) and for regulatory compliance decisions, as they will often progress 
into the managerial positions responsible for these decisions.  Experimental results may be of 
particular help in designing regulatory enforcement schemes where empirical data is often 
scarce. 
 
These results suggest that regulatory enforcers should focus more on increasing the severity 
of  punishment  than  on  increasing  the  probability  of  detection.  This  is  good  news  for 
regulators  facing  a  limited  enforcement  budget,  as  the  cost  of  imposing  (monetary) 
punishments is typically less than the cost of catching violators.  On the other hand, designing 
the optimal enforcement scheme requires considerations of justice, marginal deterrence, and 
practical upper limits on wealth, which may limit the maximum penalty. 
 
Of the auxiliary results, the strong gender effect is intriguing.  Croson and Gneezy (2009) 
propose that female social preferences are more amenable to changes in the (experimental) 
context, and it will be interesting to see if this effect holds in other similar experiments. 
Along with  testing for  a  gender effect,  future  compliance experiments  could  use a more 
diverse subject pool. 
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Table 1: Lottery Choices 
Decision   Option A   Option B   Your Choice  
1st   $10.00  if  the  die  is  1 
$8.00 if the die is 2 - 10  
$19.25  if  the  die  is  1 
$0.50 if the die is 2 - 10   A: or B:  
2nd   $10.00  if  the  die  is  1-2 
$8.00 if the die is 3 - 10  
$19.25  if  the  die  is  1-2 
$0.50 if the die is 3 - 10   A: or B:  
3rd   $10.00  if  the  die  is  1-3 
$8.00 if the die is 4 - 10  
$19.25  if  the  die  is  1-3 
$0.50 if the die is 4 - 10   A: or B:  
  …   …    
9th   $10.00 if the die is 1 - 9 
$8.00 if the die is 10  
$19.25 if the die is 1 - 9 
$0.50 if the die is 10   A: or B:  
10th   $10.00 if the die is 1 – 10  $19.25 if the die is 1 – 10  A: or B:  
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Description  Mean  Std Dev  Minimum  Maximum  n 
         
Demographic Variables         
Age (years)  20.19  3.29  17  42  139 
Female  0.50  0.50  0  1  139 
First year student  0.45  0.50  0  1  139 
Second year student  0.35  0.48  0  1  139 
Third year student  0.12  0.32  0  1  139 
Fourth year or higher  0.09  0.28  0  1  139 
Taken econ course  0.78  0.41  0  1  139 
Taken stats course  0.75  0.44  0  1  139 
           
Treatment Variables         
Inspection prob (%)  56  27.99  0  100  30 
Fine  13.76  5.45  4  20  30 
Expected fine  6.87  3.39  0  12  30 
Compliance cost  7.68  3.31  4  14  30 
           
Outcome Variables by Subject         
Number  of  periods  of 
compliance (0-30) 
15.86  4.30  3  27  139 
Number of safe lottery 
choices (0-10) 
6.09  1.41  3  9  139 
           
Outcome Variables by Round         
Compliance rate (%)  52.73  29.72  3  96  30 
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Table 3: Number of Safe Lottery Choices 
 
Number of Safe Lottery 
Choices (Option A) 
Frequency  % of  
Subjects 
Description of Risk 
Preference
# 
0-2  0  0  very risk loving 
3  5  3.6  risk loving 
4  18  12.9  risk neutral 
5  18  12.9  slightly risk averse 
6  42  30.2  risk averse 
7  36  25.9  very risk averse 
8  15  10.8  highly risk averse 
9  5  3.6  stay in bed 
TOTAL  139  100   





Table 4: Compliance Rates in Periods with No Uncertainty 
 
p  F  c  Compliance rate  Period 
0  10  5  0.03  21 
0  20  5  0.07  16 
1  4  5  0.24  12 
1  6  5  0.96  27 
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Table 5: Number of Errors made by Subjects 
 
  Number of errors in periods with no 
uncertainty 
 
  0  1  2  3  Total 
Switch back in lottery  4  4*  1  0  9 
No switch back in lottery  90  35  4  1  130 
Total  94  39  5  1  139 






Table 6: Compliance Rates in Periods with c=5  
 
Inspection Probability 
FINE  0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.6  0.8  1 
4 
             
0.24 
5 
           
0.17 
  6 
             
0.96* 
6.67 
         
0.17 
    7.50 
           
0.68* 




0.49  0.81* 
    20  0.07  0.21  0.33  0.79* 
           * indicates that pF>c so both risk averse and risk neutral individuals should comply 
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Table 7: Compliance Rates and Sign Test p-values for Predictions 1 and 2 
(Full dataset n=139; 30 periods) 
 
   
  
  Inspection Probability (Fine = pF/p) 
 
pF - c  pF  c  0.1 
 
0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6    0.8 
 
0.9 
-5  8  13 
       
0.44  <0.00>  0.13   
      -3  2  5  0.21  <0.43>  0.19 
       
 
     
-2  12  14 
           
0.66  <0.00>  0.40 
    -1.5  8  9.5 
       
0.62  <a>
  0.69  <0.00>  0.29 
    -1  4  5 
   
0.33  <b>  0.49  <0.00>  0.17  <0.64>  0.17 
    -1  10  11 
         
0.72  <0.00>  0.45  <0.00>  0.30 
                   
 
      1  8  7 
       
0.83  <1.00>  0.82  <0.47>  0.78   
  1  6  5 
     
0.79  <0.77>  0.81  <0.00>  0.68 
    1.5  12  10.5 
           
0.88  <0.68>  0.86 
    4  8  4 
       
0.85  <0.00>  0.96 
     
The numbers in <brackets> along each row are the p-values for a matched pairs sign test for adjacent cells.  In the top panel, the p-values are for 
one-sided tests that the compliance rate falls along a row. In the bottom panel, the p-values are for two-sided tests. 
a one-sided p-value for compliance increasing as move right =0.12 




 Table 8A: Probit Random Effects Results – SET 1 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Comply = 1, Violate = 0 
      All Periods  Interior I  Interior II  No Error 






































































































  0.2618 
(0.1637) 





  -0.0448 
(0.1386) 





  -0.1034 
(0.1881) 





















Session Dummies  Yes  Yes  No  Yes 
Observations  2641  2224  2224  1440 
Number of periods  19  16  16  16 
Number of subjects  139  139  139  90 
Log likelihood  -1389.77  -1238.53  -1248.88  -739.45 
Prob > Chi-squared
a  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
 
*,  **,  *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  Numbers in  parentheses are 
standard errors. Estimated using Stata 10.1.   
a  Result  of  Wald  test  of  model  significance,  degrees  of  freedom  equal  number  of  regressors  (excluding 
constant). 27 
 
Table 8B: Probit Random Effects Results – SET 2 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Comply = 1, Violate = 0 
      All Periods  Interior I  Interior II  No Error 












































































































  -0.1212 
(0.2412) 





  -0.1553 
(0.2875) 





















Session Dummies  Yes  Yes  No  Yes 
Observations  1529  1390  1390  900 
Number of periods  11  10  10  10 
Number of subjects  139  139  139  90 
Log likelihood  -611.82  -574.71  -581.64  -333.48 
Prob > Chi-squared
a  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
 
*,  **,  *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  Numbers in parentheses are 
standard errors. Estimated using Stata 10.1.   
a  Result  of  Wald  test  of  model  significance,  degrees  of  freedom  equal  number  of  regressors  (excluding 
constant). 28 
 
Table 9: Marginal Effects at Average Treatment Values 
 






PROBABILITY COMPLY  0.4222 
 
0.2892   
Inspection Probability  -0.0087  -0.0076  54 
Expected Fine  0.1803  0.1575  7 
Compliance Cost  -0.0971  -0.0848  9 
Period  0.0030  0.0026  15 
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Figure 1: Risk averse individuals are deterred more by an increase in the fine than an 
equivalent increase in the probability of detection. 
 
 
Figure 2: Proportion of safe choices by decision 
 
 





























































Figure 3: Frequency of Compliance Choices 
 
 
Figure 4: Indicative Probability of Compliance by Gender 
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